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BOOK REVIEW
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory. (Richard F. Devlin ed.)
Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 1990. Pp. vi,
538.
Reviewed by The Honorable Mr. Justice Mark R. MacGuigan*
This book1 is the first indigenously Canadian source book on juris-
prudence. Twenty five years ago there could not have been such a book
because there was no Canadian jurisprudence to speak of. That such a
book is possible today is convincing testimony to the maturity of Cana-
dian law schools - the traditional well-spring, along with the judiciary,
of jurisprudential thought.
I must confess to a fundamental disagreement with Professor Devlin
about the subject matter. Having categorized the concepts "legal the-
ory," ".jurisprudence" and "the philosophy of law" as synonyms, Profes-
sor Devlin states that "to me they simply mean thinking about law on a
sustained level."2 I would wish to add at least the notion of thinking
about law in universalist terms, across all the various fields of the law.
The alternative conjures up visions of generations of English positivist
texts on jurisprudence seldom rising to matters that the rest of the world
would consider as jurisprudential.
Nevertheless, this radical difference in perspective does not, even in
my view, mar Professor Devlin's book, because the readings he selects do
with some exceptions yield a considerable harvest of traditional jurispru-
dential questions - community and moral standards, the individual and
the community, the coercive force of law, the legal process, to name but a
few.
In fact, what is distinctive about his book, in addition to its Canadi-
anness, is its reliance on what I might call inductive rather than deduc-
tive materials. The author does not include general philosophers of the
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law - of whom there are perhaps none in Canada in any event. He
utilizes rather legal thoughtpieces which he organizes around seven con-
temporary themes: liberalism, law and economics, neo-Marxism, critical
legal studies, feminism, first nations, and constitutional interpretation.
While these clusters by no means exhaust the possible themes of such a
book - consider for example, the previous generation's jurisprudential
leitmotifs of social change and the legal process - they are highly repre-
sentative of the preoccupations of today.
Unfortunately, to my way of thinking, Professor Devlin seems to
have a bias against traditional jurisprudence. "Traditionally," he writes
in his Introduction, "jurisprudence has been conceived from the top
down... drawing on the 'high theoretical' traditions of transcendental-
ism, universalism, and abstraction."3 Its "elitism... has been the cause
of its marginalization." 4 In my view, a coherent weltanschauung makes a
greater contribution both to long-range scholarship and to pragmatic en-
lightenment, because the reader is exposed to the whole context and con-
sequences of a legal thinker's thoughts rather than to a cafeteria of
limited choices. What is to me ideal is a combination of deductive and
inductive materials, such as was sometimes achieved in the past from a
putting together of readings and cases. Nevertheless, given the dearth of
Canadian legal philosophy, Professor Devlin has shown a good sense of
discrimination in the materials he has assembled.
With three exceptions the articles included indeed appear to have
been written for this volume so that they are in the most literal sense
contributions. The writing is as simplified as jurisprudential writing is
ever likely to be, and for the most part does not presuppose esoteric
knowledge. Each chapter opens with a helpful introduction, and every
article is followed by five questions, as well as by a bibliography, all of
which will enhance the book's value as an educational tool.
Professor Devlin has put together a book that is topical in its
themes, far-reaching in its inclusiveness, and challenging in its intellec-
tual impact. All in all, this is no mean feat.
3 Id at 1.
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